Business cycles and trends in Germany and Portugal: macroeconomic policy implications in the Euro Area by Costa, Leonardo et al.
1 
 
Costa, L., Guedes de Oliveira, F., Leitão, A., & Paredes, J. (2020). Business cycles and trends 
in Germany and Portugal: macroeconomic policy implications in the Euro Area. European 
Planning Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/09654313.2020.1766424. 
 
Business cycles and trends in Germany and Portugal: macroeconomic policy 
implications in the Euro Area 
 
 
By Leonardo Costa (*), Francisca Guedes de Oliveira (*), Alexandra Leitão 
(**), and José Paredes (**) 
 
(*) Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Católica Porto Business School and CEGE  
(**) Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Católica Porto Business School  




Contact author: Francisca Guedes de Oliveira 
E-mail: foliveira@porto.ucp.pt 











We describe the business cycle neoclassical view adopted by European Institutions in the Euro 
Area, and derive the stylized facts of business cycles and trends for Germany and Portugal in 
the period 1991–2018. The data is extracted from the European Commission’s AMECO 
database. To separate cycle and trend, we use the decomposition available in the AMECO 
database for the output, and the the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the other variables. The results 
show that the amplitude of the business cycle and persistence of shocks are greater in Portugal 
than in Germany. They also show that the stylized facts of the business cycles of the two 
economies are quite different. Moreover, common shocks have asymmetric consequences. In 
the long run, there has been a convergence of inflation, general government structural balances, 
and real unit labour costs, but general government consolidated gross debt, fixed investment, 
and per capita potential GDP have been increasingly diverging, despite the behaviour of real 
wages and net exports in the two countries. Additionally, temporary shocks have permanent 
effects on the Portuguese economy. The results raise questions about the place-neutral 
macroeconomic policy enforced by the European institutions in the Euro Area, particularly in 
what concerns cohesion Member States.  
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In this paper, we adopt theoretical and empirical tools similar to those used by the European 
Institutions (EIs) to analyse the business cycle and trends of two Member States (MSs) of the 
Euro Area (EA), in the period 1991-2018: Germany, a core MS, and Portugal, a peripheral MS. 
Three main innovations of the research are: i) The overall and comparative analysis provided 
to the reader of business cycles and trends in Germany and in Portugal; ii) Testing  the new 
stylized fact by Cerra and Saxena that “(…) all types of recessions lead to a persistent loss in 
production” (Cerra and Saxena, 2017, p. 6) in our data; and iii) Discuss the appropriateness and 
feasibility of an alternative place-based (instead of place-neutral) approach to macroeconomic 
policy in the EA1. 
In June 1988 the European Council took the decision to implement an Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). In April 1989, a committee chaired by Jacques Delors proposed the EMU to be 
achieved in three stages (Committee for the Study of EMU, 1989)2. Today, the EA has 19 
members, but is still an incomplete and nonoptimal currency area. For instance, its central level 
is well equipped with monetary capacity, but still lacks financial regulatory and fiscal 
capacities. These fundamental flaws in its design explain why the 2007-2008 Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) led to a split of the EA between core MSs, such as Germany, and peripheral MSs, 
such as Portugal, inflicting enormous economic and social costs on the latter, and retarding 
economic recovery for a decade in the entire European Union (EU; on the EMU and the GFC, 
see, for instance, Krugman, 2012; Van Parijs, 2012; De Grauwe, 2013, 2018; De Grauwe and 
Ji, 2013a,b; Casaca and Artamendi, 2014; Baldwin et al., 2015; Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015; 
Costa, Martins, and Guedes de Oliveira, 2016; Wren-Lewis, 2016; Stiglitz, 2016; Macchiarelli, 
Gerba, and Diessner, 2019). 
The paper unfolds as follows. After this introduction, section 2 describes the neoclassical theory 
of the business cycle informing macroeconomic policy in the EA. This is followed by section 
3, with the empirical analysis (data and its treatment, business cycle and trend results). Section 
4 discusses the implications of the results to the current place-neutral approach to 
macroeconomic policy in the EA, and the appropriateness and feasibility of a place-based 
approach alternative. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
1 By Macroeconomic policy in the EA, we mean the policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Fiscal 
Stability Treaty (TSCG, Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in Economic an Monetary Union) 
2 On the EMU and its developments see also EC (1990, 2020), Gross and Thygesen (1998), De Grauwe (2018), 




2. The European Institutions’ neoclassical view of the business cycle  
The so-called New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS, Goodfriend, and King, 1997) combines 
neoclassical New Keynesian and New Classical macroeconomics to explain the business cycle.3 
It is still the theoretical view underlying many central banks’ decisions and policies, namely 
those of the ECB. It is also the view of the European Commission, the European Council, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), to name a few relevant international institutions. 
The NNS assumes that the economy is constantly an equilibrium-seeking and sustaining 
system. It looks at the business cycle as short run fluctuations in output around its long run 
trend. The output gap is mainly caused by temporary shocks on demand. It is assumed that these 
shocks do not have permanent effects on supply. In other words, they are neutral in the long 
run. Prices in the economy can be flexible or sluggish. Expectations may (or may not) be 
rational. Information is sometimes incomplete. The behaviour of agents has microeconomic 
foundations (in the sense of optimization). 
The NNS suggests that monetary policy can have real effects on the economy, little long run 
trade-off between inflation and output, the existence of significant gains from eliminating 
inflation, and the importance of credibility to understand the effects of monetary policy 
(Goodfriend, and King, 1997). It chooses price stability as the main target for monetary policy, 
although specific monetary policy rules have been proposed, namely by Taylor (1993, 1999), 
to minimise the output gap and the deviation of inflation from the target set by the central bank. 
The NNS does not assign any stabilisation role to fiscal policy. 
Neoclassical New Keynesianism combines i) the short run market failures and price rigidities 
of neoclassical Keynesianism; ii) the hypothesis of a long run natural equilibrium and the 
monetary policy focus of neoclassical monetarism; and iii) the possibility of rational 
expectations and the microeconomic foundations of neoclassical New Classicism. Neoclassical 
New Keynesian models explain price rigidity in the output market (e.g. Mankiw, 1985), 
nominal wage and real wage rigidity in the labour market (e.g. Yellen, 1984), failures in the 
capital markets (e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993), and other types of market failures. For 
 
3 The development of the NNS took a few decades. It all started with neoclassical Keynesianism, the theoretical 
attempt made by Hicks to reconcile Keynes’s ideas in the General Theory (Keynes, 1936) with the notion of 
Walrasian general equilibrium (see Hicks, 1937, 1980-1981), and with the empirical work on business cycles of  
Burns and Mitchell (see Burns and Mitchell, 1946). 
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neoclassical New Keynesianism, in the long run, demand-side monetary and fiscal policies are 
neutral. 
Neoclassical New Keynesianism is behind the NNS. It has adopted and transformed the 
neoclassical New Classical Real Business Cycle (RBC)4 Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models. Several of these more recent New Keynesian models incorporate, 
among others, an equation like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve: the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve (e.g. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999; Blanchard and Galí, 2007). They have been 
the workhorse models used by many central banks (Blanchard, 2015; Romer, 2016). The GFC 
and the Great Recession have questioned the ability of these models to inform monetary policy 
and have recovered a stabilisation role to fiscal policy (see Blanchard, 2015; Romer, 2016; and 
Vines and Wills, 2018). 
Regarding the EIs governance of the EA, it has been shown to be very influenced by the 
macroeconomic priorities established by Lucas (2003), the founding father of neoclassical New 
Classical macroeconomics, particularly with the GFC. Lucas (2003) sees little benefit in the 
use of active countercyclical stabilisation policies. He argues that monetary policy emphasis 
should be placed on providing price stability for the agents’ expectations formation, while fiscal 
policy emphasis should be placed on providing people with better incentives to work and save 
(Lucas, 2003). The latter are what the EIs call fiscal consolidation and supply side structural 
reforms. In the EA, structural reforms have consisted of decreasing government expenditure 
and size, deregulating markets, namely the labour market, and increasing the weight of exports 
in the economy. 
The Expansionary Fiscal Contraction (EFC) hypothesis,5 introduced by Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1990), was brought to the European political debate by Jean-Claude Trichet6 as the correct 
response to the GFC in the EA.7 In academia, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) advocate cuts in 
public spending as a way of stimulating the private sector confidence and a rapid economic 
recovery. Reinhart and Roggoff (2010), who advocate the same idea, point to a 90% limit on 
public debt from which countries would have financing problems and growth would cease.8 In 
 
4 On the RBC theory, see Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983), and Plosser (1989). 
5 Also known as the Expansionary Austerity Hypothesis (EAH). According to this hypothesis, cuts in government 
spending reduce expected long run interest rates and taxes, increasing the confidence of the private sector and 
leading it to spend more immediately, compensating for government expenditure reduction. 
6 President of the ECB at the time. 
7 The EFC hypothesis is a variation of the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH) introduced by Barro (1974). 




the EU, these ideas reinforced the EIs’ economic convictions in their response to the crisis and 
later led to the establishment of the Fiscal Stability Treaty (TSCG) and the European Semester. 
The NNS is the framework we use in this paper to address the business cycle and a few variable 
trends in Germany and Portugal. An important criticism of the NSS relates to the fact that 
temporary demand shocks can cause permanent supply effects. According to Blanchard and 
Summers (1986, 1987), business cycles can have permanent effects on supply due to 
unemployment hysteresis. The longer people are unemployed in a recession, the less 
employable they become, as they lose human capital. In addition, people start to give up looking 
for a new job. Moreover, with the GFC, many young and qualified Portuguese emigrated, 
including to Germany, and did not return to Portugal. This fact means a negative permanent 
shock on supply of the Portuguese economy (Costa, Martins, and Guedes de Oliveira, 2016), 
and a positive permanent shock on supply of the destination countries. Finally, according to 
Cerra and Saxena (2017), all types of recessions lead to permanent output losses, not only but 
also those related to financial and political crises (Cerra and Saxena, 2008). 
In the empirical analysis, we will pay special attention to the new stylized fact of Cerra and 
Saxena (2017). In the presence of permanent effects, the benefits of using active countercyclical 
stabilisation policies are not negligible, contrary to what Lucas (2003) suggested. 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
The data and its treatment 
We use annual data drawn from the European Commission AMECO database. Our choice is 
justified by the following reasons: i) it is admissible to use annual data in business cycle  
analysis; ii) this way, we avoid to deal with seasonality problems in the data, which can be 
problematic when using filters such as the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter; iii) we are dealing not 
only with cycles but also with trends; iv) it is sufficient to illustrate  the existence of important 
differences between business cycles and trends in Germany and Portugal; v) the TSCG and the 
European Semester set annual targets for the EA economies to comply with; and vi) last, but 
not least, we want to explore the AMECO data base, which is the annual macroeconomic 




The data covers the period 1991–2018 in Germany and Portugal. The year 1991 is the first in 
which there is data on unified Germany. It is also the first year after the beginning of stage one 
of the EMU, which started on 1 July 1990, with total liberalization of capital movements. 
To separate cycle and trend, we use the AMECO data’s available decomposition for the output, 
and the HP filter decomposition for the remaining variables, as suggested by the ESCB (see 
Kremer et al., 2006; Braz, Sazedj, and Campos, 2019). 
The HP filter has often been used in business cycle analysis by institutions such as the IMF. It 
was very popular in the RBC literature (Cooley and Prescott, 1995). King and Rebelo (1993) 
identified as main advantages of the use of the HP filter the fact that it can be applied to 
nonstationary series and it is simple to implement. The HP filter determines the trend of a time 
series as a weighted bilateral moving average that results from the minimization of the 
following quadratic function: 
 
T
ty  yields the long run trend at time t 
ty  time t observation of the time series  
  smoothing parameter.  
 
The cycle is given by the deviations of the trend. The smoothing parameter is a penalty factor 
on abrupt fluctuations. The value of   depends on the frequency of the data and of the economy. 
We use 100=  for Germany and 𝜆 = 30 for Portugal. The former is the value recommended 
in the literature for annual data.9 The latter is the value recommended by the Bank of Portugal 
for annual data in Portugal (see Braz, Sazedj, and Campos, 2019).10 
Although still in use, the HP filter has been criticized and other filters have been used and 
proposed in the literature. The main drawbacks of the HP filter relate to the choice of the 
smoothing parameter , which affects the results, and the boundary problem, which translates 
into errors in the estimates based on data from the beginning and end of the sample period, 
 
9 It is the value used for annual data in the United States. 
10 In Portugal, a smoothing parameter λ =30 presupposes a cycle of eight years. 


























particularly when using annual data. On these drawbacks see, for instance, Baxter and King 
(1999), Phillips and Jin (2015), and Hamilton (2018). 
Given the above, our choice of the HP filter is conservative. It is justified because it is the basis 
for many of the stylized facts of the business cycle described in the literature, and it is still being 
suggested by the ESCB. 
Variables expressed in monetary values (euros) were extracted from AMECO database at 
constant prices of 2015. For these variables (including the output) and for variables expressed 
as index numbers, the variable deviation from trend (including the output gap) is computed as 
a percentage of the variable trend value (the potential output, in the case of output). This is the 
procedure followed by the European Commission and is a way of normalizing the cyclical 
components of the two countries’ data. For variables expressed as percentages and/or Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) percentages, the variable deviation from the trend was considered as 
such. 
All calculations were performed using EXCEL or GRETL. Variables such as potential output 
and general government structural balance excluding interest rates were retrieved directly from 
the AMECO database. 
 
Business cycle results 
Tables 1 and 2 yield, respectively, the stylized facts of the business cycle of Germany and 






11 To control for the value of λ used in Portugal (λ = 30), we computed the HP filter decomposition in Portugal 
using the value of λ recommended in the literature for annual data (λ = 100). The results are very similar to the 
ones reported in Table 2, but with a higher volatility. As additional robustness controls, filter decomposition was 
computed using for the two countries the Baxter-King (BK) filter (with K=3, annual data, and assuming a 2 to 8 
years cycle ), and a filter assuming a polynomial trend of order 3. The stylized facts of the business cycles and 
trends of the two countries are, in general, alike the ones reported in the paper using the HP filter. We also have 




Table 1: Stylized facts of the business cycle in Germany (1991–2018, λ=100) 
 
Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations. Table adapted from Bonfim and Neves (2002). 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, and *10% 
The highest (in absolute terms) significant correlation coefficients are signalled with shadows 
 
Table 2: Stylized facts of the business cycle in Portugal (1991–2018, λ = 30) 
 
Stdev sd(x)/
Germany (HP filter with lambda = 100) Unit (sd) sd(GDP)
1991-2018 -1 -2 i=-2 i=-1 i=0 i=+1 i=+2
GDP 2015 prices 1.736 1.00 0.36* -0.37* -0.37* 0.36* 1.00*** 0.36* -0.37*
Expenditures
Private final consumption expenditure 2015 prices 0.850 0.49 0.55*** 0.13 -0.23 0.28 0.47** 0.32 0.06
Gross fixed capital formation 2015 prices 3.342 1.93 0.38** -0.22 -0.41** 0.20 0.72*** 0.28 -0.23
General government final consumption expenditure 2015 prices 1.241 0.71 0.58*** 0.28 0.19 0.14 -0.20 -0.22 0.10
Net exports
Net exports of goods and services gdp percentage 0.779 0.45 0.46** 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.20 -0.26
Labour market variables
Total unemployment 1000 persons 9.478 5.46 0.67*** 0.08 0.08 -0.35* -0.51*** -0.05 0.33*
Real wages 2015 prices 0.903 0.52 0.24 0.12 -0.01 0.33* 0.20 -0.19 -0.13
Real unit labour costs index 1.271 0.73 0.40** -0.17 0.45** 0.24 -0.42** -0.22 0.31
Interest rates and inflation
Nominal short-term interest rates percentage 0.955 0.55 0.50*** -0.10 -0.11 0.52*** 0.71*** 0.00 -0.47**
Nominal long-term interest rates percentage 0.425 0.25 0.31 -0.23 -0.05 0.15 0.36* -0.17 -0.64***
GDP deflator inflation percentage 0.703 0.40 0.16 -0.08 0.33* 0.64*** 0.02 -0.34* -0.34*
Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation percentage 0.629 0.36 0.08 -0.53** -0.47** 0.12 0.64*** -0.11 -0.47**
Public finance
General government net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) gdp percentage 0.875 0.50 0.36* -0.37* -0.37* 0.36* 1.00*** 0.36* -0.37*
General government consolidated gross debt gdp percentage 3.691 2.13 0.69*** 0.20 -0.14 -0.61*** -0.46** 0.13 0.42*
Autocorrelation 
coefficients
Correlation coefficient of x(t) with GDP(t + i)
Stdev sd(x)/
Portugal  (HP filter with lambda = 30) Unit (sd) sd(GDP)
1991-2018 -1 -2 i=-2 i=-1 i=0 i=+1 i=+2
GDP 2015 prices 2.189 1.00 0.76*** 0.38* 0.38* 0.76*** 1.00*** 0.76*** 0.38*
Expenditures
Private final consumption expenditure 2015 prices 2.135 0.98 0.63*** 0.10 0.20 0.54*** 0.71*** 0.39** -0.07
Gross fixed capital formation 2015 prices 6.956 3.18 0.67*** 0.11 0.15 0.57*** 0.78*** 0.50*** 0.03
General government final consumption expenditure 2015 prices 1.670 0.76 0.65*** 0.12 0.26 0.43** 0.49*** 0.30 -0.15
Net exports
Net exports of goods and services gdp percentage 1.384 0.63 0.46** 0.00 -0.16 -0.43** -0.61*** -0.31 0.03
Labour market variables
Total unemployment 1000 persons 12.152 5.55 0.69*** 0.14 -0.14 -0.60*** -0.73*** -0.44** -0.04
Real wages 2015 prices 1.373 0.63 0.09 -0.40** 0.24 0.42** 0.18 -0.11 -0.25
Real unit labour costs index 1.238 0.57 0.21 -0.46** 0.34* 0.48** 0.12 -0.13 -0.26
Interest rates and inflation
Nominal short-term interest rates percentage 0.803 0.37 0.38* -0.25 -0.04 0.25 0.32* -0.05 -0.19
Nominal long-term interest rates percentage 1.465 0.67 0.40** -0.34* 0.04 0.02 -0.15 -0.41** -0.45**
GDP deflator inflation percentage 0.873 0.40 -0.02 -0.22 -0.10 -0.09 0.20 0.24 0.14
Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation percentage 1.030 0.47 0.28 -0.35* 0.04 0.23 0.30 -0.09 -0.34*
Public finance
General government net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) gdp percentage 1.178 0.54 0.76*** 0.38* 0.38* 0.76*** 1.00*** 0.76*** 0.38*
General government consolidated gross debt gdp percentage 5.362 2.45 0.74*** 0.21 -0.20 -0.53*** -0.71*** -0.54*** -0.22
Autocorrelation 
coefficients
Correlation coefficient of x(t) with GDP(t + i)
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Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations. Table adapted from Bonfim and Neves (2002). 
Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, and *10% 
The highest (in absolute terms) significant correlation coefficients are signalled with shadows 
 
Following Bonfim and Neves (2002), and for all the macroeconomic variables analysed, the 
tables yield three types of results: i) the standard deviation of the cyclical component of each 
variable (in absolute terms and relative to the standard deviation of the cyclical component of 
GDP); ii) the autocorrelation coefficients of the contemporaneous cyclical component of each 
variable with itself in periods t = -1 and t = -2; and iii) the correlation coefficients among the 
cyclical component of each variable and the cyclical component of GDP in periods t = -2, -1, 
0, 1, and 2. The first type of results measures cycle volatility; the second type measures shocks’ 
persistence; and the third gives the stylized facts of the business cycle (see also the graphs in 
the Appendix). 
Concerning the amplitude of the cyclical behaviour of the variables considered, in general it is 
higher in Portugal than in Germany. The same holds when referring to the shocks’ persistence. 
Regarding the correlation coefficients of the several variables with GDP, which give the 
stylized facts of the business cycle, the results are the following: 
a) Expenditures 
Consumption is procyclical in both economies and coincident, as pointed out in the literature 
(Knoop, 2015, p. 25). However, the magnitude of the correlation coefficient is much higher in 
Portugal than in Germany. 
Fixed investment (gross fixed capital formation) is procyclical in both economies and 
coincident. The direction is consistent with the literature. The timing is not. The literature points 
to investment as a leading variable (Knoop, 2015, p. 25). The use of annual data may explain 
the difference. The correlation coefficient is similar in both economies. 
Government purchases (general government consumption expenditure) are acyclical in 
Germany and procyclical and coincident in Portugal. These facts are inconsistent with the 
literature. According to Knoop (2015, p.25), government expenditure is countercyclical in rich 
countries and acyclical in poor ones. 
b) Net exports 
Net exports are acyclical in Germany and countercyclical and coincident in Portugal. In 
Germany, the fact is inconsistent with the literature. In Portugal, the fact is consistent in 
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direction, but not in timing. The literature points net exports to be countercyclical but lagging 
(Knoop, 2015, p. 25). The use of annual data may explain the timing difference in Portugal. 
The second highest significant correlation coefficient in Portugal is lagging by one year. 
c) Labour market variables 
Total unemployment is countercyclical and coincident in both economies. The direction is 
consistent with the literature, but the timing is not. The literature point to this variable to be 
lagging (Knoop, 2015, p. 25). The use of annual data may explain the difference in both 
Germany and Portugal. In both economies, the second highest correlation coefficient, in 
absolute terms, is lagging. Still in absolute terms, the correlation coefficient is much higher in 
Portugal than in Germany. 
Real wages are procyclical and lagging in both economies. The literature points to the existence 
of different situations (Knoop, 2015, p. 25). 
Real unit labour costs are procyclical and lagging, although more lagging in Germany than in 
Portugal. In Portugal, the fact seems to be more explained by the cyclical behaviour of real 
wages than by the cyclical behaviour of labour productivity. The literature points labour 
productivity to be procyclical and leading (Knoop, 2015, p. 25). The correlation coefficient is 
similar in both countries. 
d) Interest rates and inflation 
Nominal short-term interest rates are procyclical and coincident in both economies.12 The 
magnitude of the correlation coefficient in Germany more than doubles the Portuguese one. 
The literature points to nominal short-term interest rates to be procyclical and lagging (Knoop, 
2015, p. 25). The direction is consistent with the literature, but the timing is not. The use of 
annual data may explain the difference. In Germany, the second highest significant correlation 
coefficient is lagging by one year. 
Nominal long-term interest rates are countercyclical and leading in both Germany and Portugal. 
The direction is inconsistent with the literature, but the timing is not (Knoop, 2015, p. 25). The 
correlation coefficient is, in absolute terms, higher in Germany than in Portugal. 
 
12 Most of the money in circulation in an economy is created by the operations of commercial banks (McLeay, 
Radia, and Thomas, 2014). However, short-term interest rates and the money in circulation can be influenced 
by the operations of the central bank (McLeay, Radia, and Thomas, 2014). 
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GDP deflator inflation is procyclical and lagging in Germany and acyclical in Portugal. This 
fact is consistent with the literature in Germany (Knoop, 2015, p. 25). 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation is procyclical and coincident in Germany and 
countercyclical and leading in Portugal. The literature points to CPI inflation to be procyclical 
and leading (Knoop, 2015, p. 25). The direction (timing), but not the timing (direction), is 
consistent with the literature in Germany (Portugal). 
e) Public finance 
General government net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) is procyclical and coincident in 
Germany and in Portugal. The variable is expressed as a percentage of GDP. The correlation 
coefficient being approximately one in both economies implies that the behaviour of this ratio 
is more dictated by the denominator than the numerator. 
General government consolidated gross debt is countercyclical and lagging in Germany and 
countercyclical and coincident in Portugal. In absolute terms, the correlation coefficient is 
higher in Portugal than in Germany. 
Some literature addresses the issue of business cycle synchronization, and part of it between 
EA countries, as a necessary condition for the successful implementation of a common 
monetary policy and/or the existence of an endogenous Optimal Currency Area (OCA) (e.g., 
Clark and van Wincoop, 2001; Belke, 2007; Gouveia and Correia, 2008; Cerqueira, 2013; 
Belke, Domnick, and Gros, 2017).13 It is not the approach we take in this paper. Instead, we 
characterize some stylized facts of the business cycle in Germany and Portugal, to identify: i) 
the degree and nature of the correlation between the cyclical behaviour of the various variables 
and the output gap; ii) the volatility of the business cycle; and iii) by filtering the cyclical 
component, the latent trends.  
Our results indicate that: i) the divergence found in the correlation between the cyclical 
component of nominal short-term interest rates (a variable strongly influenced by central banks) 
and the output gap points to a weak business cycle synchronization between the two economies; 
 
13 The results of this literature are diverse. For instance, Clark and van Wincoop (2001) find a European border 
effect – within-country correlations are substantially larger than cross-country correlations. According to the 
authors, this border effect is explained by differences in production structure, bilateral trade, and monetary 
and fiscal policies. Moreover, and concerning the EMU, inability to respond to country specific shocks can lead 
to higher business cycle volatility and lower business cycle synchronization. Belke, Domnick and Gros (2017) 
find an increased synchronization among core countries of the EA, while peripheral countries decreased 




ii) more important than just the correlation patterns, the divergence found in the amplitude of 
the business cycle also questions the adequacy of a single common monetary policy; iii) the 
divergence found in the correlation between the cyclical component of general government 
final consumption expenditure and the output gap indicates that fiscal consolidation can be a 
more demanding task in Portugal than in Germany. Given these results and its current 
governance, the EA can hardly be considered an OCA.14 
 
Trend results 
The EIs take Lucas (2003) suggested supply-side approach to macroeconomic policies in the 
EA. They are more concerned with the structural behaviour of economies than with their 
cyclical behaviour. The latter is just a means to address the latent structural behaviour. In this 
section, we look at the trends of inflation, general government structural balance excluding 
interest, and general government consolidated gross debt, three macroeconomic policy targets 
in the EA, real unit labour costs and real wages, net exports, fixed investment (as a percentage 
of potential GDP), and per capita potential GDP, addressing the issue of convergence. 
a) CPI inflation 
Figure 1: Trend CPI inflation (Germany, Portugal, and difference, 1991–2018) 
  
 
14 Dividing the data into three periods - period 1 (1991-1998, before the euro); period 2 (1999-2007, with the 
euro before the CGF); and period 3 (2008-2018, with the euro and the GFC), the nature of the main results 
obtained does not change. In addition, in both countries, the volatility of the output gap first decreases (from 
period 1 to period 2), and after increases (from period 2 to period 3). This latter increase is much more 





























































































































Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations. 
For Germany, data is only available since 1996. CPI inflation has converged in the two 
countries to less than 1%, well below the 2% target. 
b) General government structural balance excluding interest 





General government structural balance excluding interest has converged in the two countries, 
with Portugal having surpluses higher than Germany and above 2% since 2014. 
c) General government consolidated gross debt 
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Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations. 
Since 2004, general government gross debt has been strongly diverging in Portugal and 
Germany. With the Euro adoption, in 1999, the general government gross debt has increased 
more rapidly in Portugal than in Germany. Moreover, in Germany, it has started to decline after 
2012. 
d) Trend real unit labour costs and trend real wages 
Figure 4: Trend real unit labour costs (Germany, Portugal, and difference, 1991–2018) 
 
Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations. 
 











































































































































































































































Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 4 shows a convergence of trend real unit labour costs, and Figure 5 an increasing 
divergence of trend real wages.15 At least in part, the latter explains the former. 
e) Net exports  
 Figure 6: Trend net exports (Germany, Portugal, and difference, 1991–2018) 
 
Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 6 illustrates an increasing convergence of trend net exports after 2006. 
f) Trend fixed investment 
 






















































































































































































































































Figure 7: Trend fixed investment (Germany, Portugal, and difference, 1991–2018) 
 
Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 7 illustrates trend fixed investment (or gross fixed capital formation) as a percentage of 
potential GDP in the two countries. It shows that, since 1999, trend fixed investment has 
declined in Portugal, and after 2010 has been lower in Portugal than in Germany. 
g) Per capita potential GDP 
Figure 8: Per capita potential GDP (Germany, Portugal, and difference, 1991–2018) 
 


























































































































































































































































Figure 8 illustrates the behaviour of per capita potential GDP.16 Portugal has been increasingly 
diverging from Germany in the entire period. This divergence increased after 1999, when the 
Euro was adopted. After 2008, with the GFC, the Portuguese per capita potential GDP has 
stagnated. 
We conclude that the one-size-fits-all place neutral macroeconomic policy enforced by the EIs 
in the EA has been successful in the period in achieving long run price stability and general 
government structural balance excluding interest surpluses. It was also successful in promoting 
the convergence of long run real unit labour costs (with the relative decline of long run real 
wages in Portugal), and long run net exports. However, the two countries have been diverging 
regarding long run general government consolidated gross debt, long run fixed investment, and 
per capita potential GDP, despite all other progress. These last three results raise questions 
about the costs of the macroeconomic policy pursued in the EA for cohesion countries such as 
Portugal.17 
  
VAR models results 
Temporary shocks can produce a permanent macroeconomic impact (Blanchard and Summers, 
1986; Cerra and Saxena, 2017). Shortfalls in aggregate demand may diminish aggregate supply 
(Yellen, 2016). For instance, a shortfall in investment (demand shock) reduces the capital stock 
in the long run (supply shock) (IMF, 2015; Cerra and Saxena, 2017). Moreover, aggressive cuts 
in government expenditure (demand shock) may increase unemployment and labour force 
emigration, which reduces the labour and human capital stocks in the long run (supply shock, 
Costa, Martins, and Guedes de Oliveira, 2016). In contrast, expansionary macro policies during 
recessions help recover some of the lost output (Yellen, 2016). 
 
16 In the calculations, we are considering the trend population obtained with the HP filter. 
17 According to Alcidi et al. (2016), “For an economy that starts with a large current account deficit (like Greece 
or Portugal, but much less Ireland), export growth is the key to long-term growth” (Alcidi et al., 2016, page 350). 
Moreover, Belke, Oeking and Setzer (2015) find a strong substitution effect between domestic demand and 
export of goods during more extreme stages of the business cycle in Portugal, such that during business cycle 
troughs domestic demand is relevant for the exporting dynamics. Our results show that the trend of net exports 
in Portugal has increased since 2002 and that the growing convergence of German and Portuguese trends, after 
2006, was not sufficient to prevent an increasing divergence in potential GDP per capita, at least, since 1991. 
Differences in sectoral composition, technological capabilities, and firm performance in the two countries may 
explain this divergence (see Gräbner et al., 2019). 
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To assess the links between temporary demand shocks and permanent effects on supply in both 
countries, we estimate two VAR systems using GRETL.18 Model 1 allows us to perform a 




Model 2 has as a dependent variable the potential output (output gap) and treats the output gap 
(potential output) as an exogenous variable, allowing to assess the impact of the output gap 






𝑝  potential output at time t 
𝑦𝑡
𝑔
 output gap at time t 
 
Table 3 yields the estimation results of Model 1. 
 
Table 3: Model 1 coefficients and Granger causality test 
 
18 GRETL output is made available to the reader upon request. The null hypothesis of the longest lag being 1 
was rejected against the alternative hypothesis of the longest lag being 2. 
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+ 𝑢𝑡 (3) 
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+ 𝑢𝑡 (4) 
 𝑦𝑡
𝑔










 Germany Portugal 
constant −14.085 1.10278 
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑝
 1.729*** 2.197*** 
𝑦𝑡−2
𝑝
 −0.720*** −1.207*** 
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔
 −1.032 −0.258** 
𝑦𝑡−2
𝑔
 0.726 −0.216*** 
F tests   
All lags of 𝒚𝒕
𝒑
 F(2, 21) =   31129.000*** F(2, 21) =   10710.000*** 
All lags of 𝒚𝒕
𝒈




 Germany Portugal 
constant −2.779 −6.346* 
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑝
 0.052* 0.810*** 
𝑦𝑡−2
𝑝
 -0.052* −0.785*** 
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔
 0.253 0.355 
𝑦𝑡−2
𝑔
 -0.503*** −0.334** 
F tests   
All lags of 𝒚𝒕
𝒑
 F(2, 21) =   1.5394 F(2, 21) =   7.3499*** 
All lags of 𝒚𝒕
𝒈
 F(2, 21) =   4.7909 ** F(2, 21) =   2.4329 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, and *10% 
 
Looking at the results of the F tests in Table 3, we can see that output gap (potential output) 
granger causes potential output (output gap) in Portugal but not in Germany. In other words, 
we have evidence of Granger's causality between the output gap and the potential output only 
in Portugal and working both ways. 
 
Table 4 yields the estimation results of Model 2. 
 





 Germany Portugal 
constant -6.647 6.277*** 
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑝
 1.671*** 1.461*** 
𝑦𝑡−2
𝑝
 -0.664*** -0.490*** 
𝑦𝑡
𝑔




 Germany Portugal 
constant -0.864 1.563 
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔
 0.375* 1.002*** 
𝑦𝑡−2
𝑔
 −0.417** -0.417** 
𝑦𝑡
𝑝
 0.000 -0.010 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, and *10% 
 
Table 4 shows that: i) the output gap positively affects potential output in Portugal, but not in 
Germany; and ii) potential output has no significant effect on output gap in both countries. 
We conclude that temporary shocks on demand (the output gap) have permanent effects on 
supply (the potential output) in Portugal, but not in Germany.19 
 
4. Policy implications 
Our results show that these two economies of the EA are different in many respects. The 
amplitude of the business cycle and the persistence of the shocks are higher in Portugal than in 
Germany. Not only have both countries suffered asymmetric shocks a few times (as happened 
during the peak of the Euro crisis), but also common shocks clearly have asymmetric 
consequences. Moreover, we expect aggressive fiscal consolidation efforts (demand shock) to 
cause major output losses (supply shock) in Portugal, but not in Germany. 
 
19 In light of the results in Table 4, Table 3 results are easy to explain. For example, in Portugal, the lagged 
output gap leads the EIs to act, reducing the current output gap and potential GDP. As a result, a negative 




In the long run, there has been a convergence of CPI inflation and general government structural 
balances excluding interest, real unit labour costs, and net exports, but general government 
consolidated gross debt, fixed investment, and per capita potential GDP have been increasingly 
diverging, despite the behaviour of real wages and net exports. Therefore, it seems that the one-
size-fits-all place-neutral macroeconomic policy approach enforced by the EIs in the EA works 
for the benefit of core countries like Germany, but not for the benefit of peripheral countries 
like Portugal. This may explain why the EU took more time to recover from the Great Recession 
than the United States. 
Contrary to the assertion of Lucas (2003), stabilisation policies in cohesion MSs such as 
Portugal may have benefits that are not negligible, given that countercyclical policies can 
significantly reduce permanent losses in output and/or the decline in potential output in 
recessions. To better address these and other differences among EA MSs, the EIs should adopt 
a place-based approach to macroeconomic policy in the EA. 
A place-based approach to sectoral policies has been advocated on the EU agenda, as is 
illustrated by the Territorial Agenda of the European Union 2020 – TA2020 (Council of the 
European Union, 2011).20 So far, it has been first adopted by the LEADER programme of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and after by the cohesion policy (see EC, 2015). Recently, 
it is being discussed its adoption in the first pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
We suggest the EIs extending this type of approach to macroeconomic policy in the EA. A 
place-based approach will allow not only to deal better with the macroeconomic stability of the 
different Eurozone territories, but also to better articulate macroeconomic policy and sectoral 
policies in the different territories. 
Can monetary policy in the EA, a single-currency area, be place-based? Monetary policy in the 
EA is conducted by the ECB focusing on price stability in normal times.21 In theory, it is 
possible for the ECB, for instance, to implement place-based open market operations. 
Moreover, in response to the Euro crisis, the ECB under Mário Draghi’s tenure has been able 
to implement exceptional measures such as quantitative easing. Except for Greece (at the time 
still under a rescue program), this policy was (but need not have been) place-neutral. 
 
20 On place-neutral versus place-based approaches, see Barca, McCann, and Rodríguez‐Pose (2012) and Pugalis 
and Gray (2016). See also OECD (2002, 2009, and 2017). 
21 Several authors have questioned the single mission and the 2% limit on inflation (see, for instance, Krugman, 
2012; Stiglitz, 2016). 
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Consequently, the answer to the question is positive.  Even more positive if monetary policy is 
combined with fiscal policy. 
Can fiscal rules and/or policy in the EA be place-based in a single currency area such as the 
EA? The fiscal rules are monitored by the European Commission through the European 
Semester focusing on deficit and debt reduction. Again, it was a political choice of the EIs to 
make these rules place-neutral instead of place-based, not making distinctions between, for 
instance, cohesion and/or peripheral Member States such as Portugal and core Member States 
such as Germany. Hence, again, even with a common denominator, the answer to the question 
is positive. 
Adopting a place-based approach to macroeconomic policy would help the EIs to achieve their 
overall macroeconomic goals in EA, whatever they may be, and not the other way around. 
Two main barriers to the completion of the euro zone and the adoption of a place-based 
approach to macroeconomic policy are: i) the way  the EU budget is funded22; and ii) the 
territories of macroeconomic policy in the EA. To shift EU budget funding from MSs’ resources 
to the EU’s own resources would be a way of removing the first barrier, particularly if the EU 
levied taxes on capital which MSs could not collect. 
Regarding the second barrier, there is nothing to prevent macroeconomic policy from 
descending to the regional level and addressing regional business cycles and trends. The policy 
distinction of territories would be between types of regions of the MSs (instead of between 
MSs), as in cohesion policy. This would not only reduce tensions between EA MSs, but also 
help to articulate macroeconomic policy with sectoral policies. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Germany is a core Member State of the EA, while Portugal is a peripheral one. Adopting the 
NNS paradigm of the business cycle and the approach suggested by the ESCB, we have 
described the business cycle and a few variable trends of the two countries, in the period 1991–
2018. 
In general, the business cycle amplitude is higher in Portugal than in Germany, corroborating 
previous findings in the literature. The same holds for shocks’ persistence. Regarding the 
 
22 The EU budget is funded with its own resources and resources from the Member States. The former includes, 
for instance, customs duties levied. The latter provide the bulk of the budget. 
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business cycle stylized facts, there are important differences between the cyclical behaviour of 
the two economies, in both direction and timing. Moreover, temporary shocks on demand may 
cause permanent losses of output, notably in cohesion countries like Portugal. All these imply 
that common shocks may have asymmetric consequences. In addition, the shocks can be 
asymmetric, as happened during the peak of the EA crisis. Together with the place-neutral 
macroeconomic policy approach pursued by the EIs in the EA, all these may explain, at least 
in part, the long run increasing divergence of general government gross debt, fixed investment, 
and per capita potential GDP between the two countries, despite the behaviour of real wages 
and net exports. 
To be more effective, the macroeconomic policy approach adopted in the EA should be place-
based instead of place-neutral. This also would allow a better combination between 
macroeconomic and sectoral policies, making the entire policy framework of the EU more cost-
effective. 
Two main barriers to the EIs completing the EA and adopting a place-based approach for all 
policies are: i) the way the EU budget is funded (and its small size); and ii) the territories of 
macroeconomic policy (countries) in the EA. Shifting EU budget funding from MSs’ resources 
to the EU’s own resources would allow for a bigger budget that would not weigh on national 
budgets, and thus it could be a way of removing this barrier. Making macroeconomic policy in 
the EA descending to the regional level would allow not only to reduce tensions between EA 
MSs but also help to better adjust the stabilisation role of macroeconomic policy to the different 
needs of the various regions and to articulate macroeconomic policy with sectoral policies, 
making the entire policy-framework more cost effective. In the EU, regional policy could 
assume the role of the missing industrial policy. 
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